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ABSTRACT 
Never has the issue of sovereign credit ratings attracted such an interest by policy and opinion makers, 
bankers and journalists, or even the public opinion, as witnessed in the last couple of years. In spite of 
being accused of contributing to the instability of financial markets, credit rating agencies have 
undoubtedly a role in financial markets, affecting its performance and guiding investor’s decisions. This 
paper analyzes the impact of the announcement of changes in Moody’s ratings over the performance of a 
set of rated firms quoted in the Portuguese stock market. Following an event study methodology, we 
collect ratings and outlook announcements by that major credit agency over the period 2006-2011. We 
find a significant response of share prices to changes in ratings, with that response anticipating the 
announcement. We think that could be explained by previous sovereign rating changes or to the contagion 
effects of a bearish market. When analyzing the period after January 2010, we observe a stronger reaction 
to announcements, which is understandable given the greater influence and market sensitivity to rating 
agencies.    
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“There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. 
There’s the United States, and there’s Moody’s Bond Rating Service. 
 The United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, 
 and Moody’s can destroy you by downgrading your bonds”. 
 
Thomas Friedman (remarks at “News Hour”, 13
th
 February, 1996)  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Never has the issue of sovereign credit ratings attracted such an interest by policy and 
opinion makers, bankers and journalists, or even the public opinion, as witnessed in the 
last couple of years
1
. Portugal is a case in point, with recent downgrades by the major 
credit agencies prompting the call for a financial rescue plan by the troika 
(IMF/ECB/EC). 
The credit rating literature has mainly focused on analyzing the effects of bond rating 
changes on individual stock returns, existing less literature on whether changes in 
sovereign or individual ratings have any impact on stock markets. To contribute to this 
research, this paper analyzes the impact of the announcement of changes in Moody’s 
ratings over the performance of a set of rated firms quoted in the Portuguese stock 
market
2
. Following an event study methodology, we collect ratings and outlook 
announcements by that major credit agency over the period 2006-2011. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the main 
literature, section 3 describes the data and the methodology and section 4 presents the 
results. Closing the paper, section 5 presents a short summary of our work. 
    
 
 
  
                                                
1
 A credit rating represents an assessment of the overall creditworthiness of an obligor in terms of both its 
capacity and willingness to meet its financial commitments as they fall due. Accordingly, rating agencies 
provide an evaluation of a country’s creditworthiness and impart a rating to that country. In the case of 
Moody’s the grade goes from Aaa to C. Rating agencies also provide an “outlook” or “watchlist” with 
prospective changes in ratings. The outlook is typically positive, stable or negative, where a positive 
(negative) outlook means that a rating may be revised upward (downward).    
2
 Moody’s began rating the creditworthiness of countries in 1974. The first rating for Portugal was 
assigned in 1995 and for a Portuguese firm in 2006. 
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2. Review of the literature    
 
In the last twenty five years several papers examined the response of stock returns to 
bond rating changes. This literature is primarily focused on the information content of 
bond rating change announcements. If rating agencies base their rating changes on 
publicly available information, the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) predicts that 
stock prices will not adjust in response to the ratings change event. Therefore to the 
extent that stock prices are found to react to bond rating changes, this implies either 
evidence against the semi-strong form EMH, or, the presence of some private 
information available only to rating agencies that has, as a consequence, come into the 
public domain. That is, rating changes may unveil (new) private information, thus 
fuelling rallies or downturns. Some of the main papers in this field are Glascock et al. 
(1987), Hand et al. (1992), Goh and Ederington (1993), Barron et al. (1997), Dichev 
and Piotroski (2001), Joo and Pruitt (2006) and Afonso et al. (2011). According to 
Subasi (2008, p. 47), the main findings of these studies are three fold: first, if credit 
ratings are associated with significant market returns, this result supports the idea that 
rating agencies reveal new information to financial markets; second, in general, 
downgrade announcements are associated with significant negative returns in both stock 
and bond markets; finally, upgrade announcements rarely have an impact on stock and 
bond markets. 
Nevertheless, the line of research that we are interested in is the effect of changes in 
sovereign ratings over stock markets and individual shares. Kaminsky and Schmukler 
(2002) analyzed the impact of changes in sovereign rating and outlook on financial 
markets in emerging markets, founding that downgrades were associated with two 
percent increase in average bond yield spreads and about one percent decrease in 
average stock returns. Further, those authors found contagion effects between emerging 
markets and that rating changes lagged market movements. Previously, Richards and 
Deddouche (1999), using emerging market bank-level data, examined the impact of 
bank ratings on bank stock prices. Also Brooks et al. (2004), using a sample of 
developed and emerging markets over thirty years examined the impact of sovereign 
rating changes on stock markets. Their results indicated that rating downgrades for 
foreign currency were associated with significant negative excess returns, while for 
rating upgrades weren’t detected positive excess returns. More recently, Arezki et al. 
(2011) show that sovereign rating announcements have statistically and economically 
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significant spillover effects both across countries and financial markets, implying that 
rating agencies announcements could spur financial instability. Also, the sign and the 
magnitude of the spillover effects depends both on the type of announcements, the 
source country experiencing the downgrade and the rating agency from which the 
announcement originate. Those authors also show that rating agencies have not 
anticipated the macroeconomic weaknesses of European economies consecutive to the 
financial crisis
3
.  
But should sovereign rating have a clear impact on stock markets? Several authors 
consider that stock market participants, being rational and well informed, don’t consider 
sovereign rating as new information, since those rating changes are anticipated by the 
market and hence incorporated in prices well before the change occurs (see Goh and 
Ederington, 1993 and Reisen and Maltzan, 1999). Nevertheless, if negative rating 
announcements take markets mostly by surprise, that could either imply that 
fundamentals are not fully discounted by market participants or that, at least on some 
occasions, rating events diverged from such fundamentals. Finally, Reinhart (2001) 
examines whether rating agencies actions anticipated the crisis of the 1990’s. With a 
large sample of countries and crises, the author concludes that rating changes far from 
being leading indicators of crises have turned out to be lagging indicators of financial 
collapses. So, the aftermath of rating changes could be something uneventful, with no 
changes after the announcement and with variables maintaining the gains or losses 
observed in the preceding days. 
 
 
3. Data and research methodology 
 
To analyze the impact of credit ratings on the Portuguese stock market, we collect 
individual ratings emanated from Moody’s credit rating agency since 2006
4
. The rating 
announcements are obtained from its web page. For the selected firms, our observation 
period for which we have both rating and outlook changes includes 49 events, of 
which17 are downgrades. The others are outlooks, predominantly negative and in the 
                                                
3 This delay by rating agencies is also evidenced in papers by Mora (2006) and White (2010). 
4
 Deciding to choose only one rating agency we opted for Moody’s due to its historical presence and 
influence (confirmed, for instance, by Arezki et al., 2011). 
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period didn’t occur any upgrades
5
. Table 1 reports the different credit rating events for 
Portugal and Table 2 presents the rating events for the seven selected firms. 
 
Table 1: Moody’s sovereign rating announcements and actions for Portugal 
Date Rating Outlook 
 upgrades downgrades upgrades downgrades 
05-07-2011  from Baa1 to Ba2   negative 
05-04-2011  from A3 to Baa1  on review 
15-03-2011  from A1 to A3  negative 
21-12-2010    possible downgrade 
13-07-2010  from Aa2 to A1  stable 
05-05-2010    possible downgrade 
29-10-2009    negative 
Source: Moody’s 
 
Comparing both tables we clearly see that Moody’s tends to downgrade the PSI-20 
firms the day after Portugal’s downgrade. Also, the data shows that changes in outlook 
are followed by changes in rating. As we can see, roughly 67 percent of the changes in 
outlook are followed by a change in rating, being the time interval between changes 
around two months (see also Figure A1 in the Appendix).   
                                                
5 We consider changes in outlook given that they tend to anticipate movements in the rating notation, so 
that the information content of the outlook is in itself valuable for explaining the movements of share 
prices. 
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Table 2: Moody’s rating announcements and actions for the selected quoted firms 
BRISA     PT     
Date Rating Rating Action Date Rating Rating Action 
08-07-2011 Baa3 Downgrade 29-07-2011 Baa3 Confirm negative 
outlook 
06-04-2011 Baa1 Possible downgrade 08-07-2011 Baa3 Possible downgrade 
22-12-2010 Baa1 Unchanged 07-06-2011 Baa3 Downgrade 
24-12-2008 Baa1 Possible downgrade 06-04-2011 Baa2 Possible 
Downgrade 
04-08-2008 Baa1 Downgrade 05-03-2007 Baa2 Confirm only (P.R.) 
29-11-2006 A3 New 
    
BPI   BES   
Date Rating Rating Action Date Rating Rating Action 
15-07-2011 Baa3 Downgrade 15-07-2011 Ba1 Downgrade 
06-04-2011 Baa2 Possible downgrade 06-04-2011 Baa2 Possible downgrade 
09-12-2010 A2 Possible downgrade 09-12-2010 A2 Possible downgrade 
14-07-2010 A2 Downgrade 14-07-2010 A2 Downgrade 
05-05-2010 A1 Possible downgrade 05-05-2010 A1 Possible downgrade 
16-09-2009 A1 Confirm only (P.R.) 16-09-2009 A1 Downgrade 
06-04-2009 A1 Possible downgrade 06-04-2009 Aa3 Possible downgrade 
13-04-2007 A1 New 13-04-2007 Aa3 New 
BCP   EDP   
Date Rating Rating Action Date Rating Rating Action 
15-07-2011 Ba1 Downgrade 08-07-2011 Baa3 Downgrade 
06-04-2011 Baa3 Possible downgrade 06-04-2011 Baa1 Possible downgrade 
09-12-2010 A3 Possible downgrade 17-03-2011 Baa1 Downgrade 
14-07-2010 A3 Downgrade 21-12-2010 A3 Possible downgrade 
05-05-2010 A1 Possible downgrade 09-06-2009 A3 Downgrade 
16-09-2009 A1 Downgrade 19-10-2007 A2 Confirm only (P.R.) 
06-04-2009 Aa3 Possible downgrade 27-03-2007 A2 Possible downgrade 
13-04-2007 Aa3 New 
REN   
Date Rating Rating Action 
08-07-2011 Baa3 Downgrade 
06-04-2011 Baa2 Possible downgrade 
17-03-2011 Baa1 Downgrade 
21-12-2010 A3 Possible downgrade 
13-07-2010 A3 Downgrade 
05-05-2010 A2 Possible downgrade 
28-04-2008 A2 New 
Source: Moody’s 
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Concerning the stock market data, we obtained daily quotes for seven individual shares 
and for the PSI-20 market index from the site bolsapt.com. We analyzed the period 
from September 2006 to the end of July 2011
6
. 
The performance of the PSI-20 index in the considered period is illustrated by the 
following graph: 
 
Figure 1: PSI-20 index 
 
Source: www.bolsapt.com 
 
The performance of these seven shares in the considered period is illustrated by the 
following graph: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
6
 1263 days, except for REN, that starts in July 2007. We choose this period because only after 2006/2007 
did some Portuguese quoted firms started being rated by Moody’s. This period also encompasses the start 
of the sub-prime crisis, the ensuing financial and economic crisis and the recent sovereign debt crisis felt 
in Europe. 
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Figure 2: Selected shares (values in €) 
 
Source: www.bolsapt.com 
 
The methodological starting point of this paper is to recognize that standard time-series 
techniques may not be well suited when dealing with the analysis of rating 
announcements and stock market performance. Stock market quotes are typically highly 
volatile on a day-to-day basis and rating announcements are infrequent, occurring on a 
single day. So, to overcome these problems, most papers have so far used event study 
techniques, where each individual credit rating and outlook changes is defined as a 
single event
7
. Afterwards, it is defined an event period, comprising the six prior event 
days, the event day and the four pos-event days, over which stock returns will be 
examined. The use of this narrow window allows reducing contamination problems 
which may bias the results of the analysis.               
The event study methodology allows us to study the effect of a downgrade on the 
evolution of stock prices around the event. Of course, other factors might take place at 
                                                
7 An important reference for such an approach applied to sovereign ratings is Gande and Parsley (2005). 
For one of the first applications of event study methodology to financial markets see Brown and Warner 
(1980). 
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the same time, which also affect the evolution of stock prices
8
. Standard event-study 
methodology requires linking rating events to abnormal returns. Traditionally, daily risk 
adjusted abnormal market returns (ar) are derived from the conventional market model: 
 
 arit = rit – ( αi + βi rmt )      (1) 
 
where rit is the return on asset i at day t 
rmt is the corresponding return on the PSI-20 index at day t, and αi and βi are the 
market model parameters obtained from an OLS regression applied to all the 
period. 
Afterwards, we compute the average abnormal return (aar) in each window day: 
  
aart = 
1
N
∑ arit
N
i1         (2) 
 
where N is the number of events. The average abnormal return is also aggregated 
through the event window, originating the cumulative average abnormal returns (caar). 
For any interval (t1 = - 6, t2 = 4) in the event window, caar is defined as: 
  
caar (t1, t2) = ∑ cart
t2
tt1
        (3) 
 
The null hypothesis (H0) that the event has no impact in share prices before the 
announcement could be tested by the following statistics: 
 
 θ1
aart
varaart
1/2
~N0,1       (5) 
 
 θ2
,   
varcaar-6, 41/2
~N0,1       (6) 
 
The results for these statistics are in the Appendix (Tables A4 and A5). 
 
 
                                                
8
 We are not controlling for those factors and we assume that on average there is no particular bias in the 
event studies. We expect that those other factors influence stock prices both positively and negatively in a 
random way. 
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4. Empirical results         
 
Performing an OLS regression we obtain the following estimated β and R
2
 for each 
share: 
 
Table 3: Estimated β and R2 
Shares β R
2 
BES 
0,282 
(5,71) *** 
0,025 
BPI 
1,034 
(28,72) *** 
0,396 
BCP 
1,244 
(35,222) *** 
0,496 
PT 
0,934 
(30,103) *** 
0,418 
BRISA 
0,404 
(11,525) *** 
0,095 
EDP 
0,969 
(40,724) *** 
0,568 
REN 
0,522 
(17,156) *** 
0,221 
 Note: the values in brackets represent the t-statistics and *** denotes a 1% significance level. 
 
A simple normality test shows that the abnormal returns do not present a normal 
distribution with zero mean and constant variance (see Table A1 in the Appendix)
9
. 
Concerning the individual abnormal returns (Figures A2 and A3 in the Appendix) we 
concluded that with the exception of Brisa and PT the caar are negative since the 
beginning of the event window, decreasing rapidly in the following days, with the 
exception of Brisa and EDP. At the end of the event window only BPI is positive, with 
EDP barely untouched. This suggests the possibility of market anticipation of the 
announcement. There is also a different performance of the caar after day 0. For 
instance, PT continues to decrease, whereas BES and BCP seem to stabilize around 
session 3. Since it is risky to take conclusions from individual shares, the following 
figures present the average abnormal returns and the cumulative average abnormal 
                                                
9 Even that the distributions aren’t normal, the central limit theorem assures that if the values for the 
abnormal returns for all the shares are i.i.d. then the average distribution of the sample’s abnormal returns 
converges to normality as the number of shares in the sample increases. 
11 
 
returns before and after an announcement, but now in aggregate terms. For presentation 
purposes we distinguished between banks (BES, BPI and BCP) and ex-banks (PT, 
BRISA, EDP and REN). Table A2 in the Appendix presents the values of those two 
variables for these different groups: total, banks and ex-banks. 
 
 
Figure 3: Average abnormal returns before and after an announcement 
 
 
Figure 4: Cumulative average abnormal returns before and after an announcement 
 
 
The figures present some evidence of an anticipation of the downgrade by the market 
players, yet with some reversal after day 0. This reversal is stronger in the banking 
sector, while ex-banks continue to display negative abnormal returns. Notice that, since 
usually the firm downgrade occurs days after the sovereign downgrade, it is natural to 
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observe some anticipation, whereas the bearish sentiment felt in the market also 
contributes.     
Nevertheless, when we consider only a more recent period beginning in January 2010, 
as marking the inception of the sovereign debt crisis, the average abnormal returns and 
the cumulative average abnormal returns present a somehow different pattern (Figures 
5 and 6). Table A3 also presents these results. 
 
Figure 5: Average abnormal returns before and after an announcement (after January 2010) 
 
 
Figure 6: Cumulative average abnormal returns before and after an announcement  
(after January 2010) 
 
 
Now all the shares, and in particular the banking ones, display a stronger negative 
reaction to downgrades, anticipating those events. At the announcement date we 
observe a total aar of -1,5% and the numbers continue to decrease in the following 
-0,03
-0,025
-0,02
-0,015
-0,01
-0,005
0
0,005
0,01
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
total
banks
ex-banks
-0,180
-0,160
-0,140
-0,120
-0,100
-0,080
-0,060
-0,040
-0,020
0,000
0,020
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
total
banks
ex-banks
13 
 
days. Also, now is clearly the banking sector that pushes down the abnormal returns, 
before and after an announcement, albeit being the first to start to recover. 
In terms of significance, Table A4 and A5 in the Appendix show the results for statistics 
θ1 and θ2. The average abnormal returns are more significant after the announcement 
date, albeit aren’t significant for the banking sector. Considering only the period after 
January 2010, the significance tests are slightly more robust, nevertheless continuing 
weak for banks. Notice that, in both cases we continue to observe highly significant 
average abnormal returns after the announcement date. In relation to the cumulative 
average abnormal returns they only become significant after the announcement date 
(with the exception of the banking sector). Also in the period after January 2010, the 
results for the cumulative average abnormal returns become more significant in the 
post-announcement phase, suggesting the presence of a drift or contagion in share 
prices. 
Finally, we analyze causality between sovereign credit ratings and share prices. In order 
to perform a causality test between announcements and stock returns we transform the 
ratings into a discrete variable, ranging from 1 to 17 (Table A3 in the Appendix)
10
. We 
do not find causality between ratings and returns and we could not reject the null in all 
cases, except for PT, where we reject the null that the stock returns do not cause the 
rating (Table A4 in the Appendix).  
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 
This paper analyzes the impact of the announcement of changes in credit ratings over 
the performance of a set of rated firms quoted in the Portuguese stock market. We find a 
significant response of share prices to changes in both the credit rating notations and in 
the outlook. This response seems to anticipate the announcements, either due to a 
previous sovereign downgrade or to the contagion effects of a bearish market outlook. 
Also, when analyzing the period after January 2010, we observe a stronger negative 
reaction to announcements, which is understandable given the greater influence and 
                                                
10
 Afonso et al. (2011) perform a similar analysis. 
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market sensitivity to rating agencies. These conclusions shed some light on the 
connection between share prices’ performance and individual credit ratings. The fact 
that negative rating events don’t take share prices by surprise can either imply that 
fundamentals are already fully discounted by market participants or that rating events 
go, with some delay, after such fundamentals. This is a simple exercise, which could 
benefit from several extensions: first, it would be interesting to study whether the three 
main rating agencies affect stock prices differently; also, an additional extension would 
be to use more complete models to compute abnormal returns; finally, since usually 
individual rating changes occur days after a sovereign rating change, we could also 
relate the individual firms performance in the stock market with changes in sovereign 
ratings.   
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Appendix 
 
Figure A1: Ratings (source: Moody’s)  
 
 
Table A1: Abnormal returns – normality test 
 BES BPI BCP PT BRISA EDP REN 
Skewness -3,882756 0,228166 -0,128972 -0,451994 -0,854495 0,079787 -0,364509 
Kurtosis 75,50917 9,823372 4,907130 22,28858 8,971082 7,191521 12,29321 
Jarque-Bera 279632,0 2459,146 194,7518 19606,56 2028,374 925,1677 3769,078 
Prob. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nº. of observ. 1262 1262 1262 1262 1262 1262 1041 
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Figure A2: Abnormal returns for the individual shares 
 
 
Figure A3: Cumulative average abnormal returns for the individual shares 
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Table A2: Average abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns 
Days 
Total Banks Ex-Banks 
AAR CAAR AAR CAAR AAR CAAR 
-6 -0,002 -0,002 -0,007 -0,007 0,001 0,001 
-5 -0,008 -0,011 -0,011 -0,019 -0,006 -0,004 
-4 -0,009 -0,020 -0,015 -0,034 -0,005 -0,009 
-3 -0,007 -0,027 -0,008 -0,042 -0,006 -0,015 
-2 -0,010 -0,037 -0,011 -0,052 -0,010 -0,025 
-1 -0,008 -0,044 -0,005 -0,057 -0,010 -0,035 
0 -0,008 -0,052 -0,002 -0,059 -0,012 -0,047 
1 -0,012 -0,064 -0,009 -0,069 -0,014 -0,061 
2 -0,014 -0,078 -0,006 -0,074 -0,020 -0,081 
3 -0,014 -0,093 -0,002 -0,077 -0,023 -0,104 
4 -0,006 -0,099 0,014 -0,062 -0,022 -0,127 
 
Table A3: Average abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns 
(after January 2010) 
Days 
Total Banks Ex-Banks 
AAR CAAR AAR CAAR AAR CAAR 
-6 -0,002 -0,002 -0,009 -0,009 0,003 0,003 
-5 -0,012 -0,014 -0,017 -0,026 -0,008 -0,008 
-4 -0,012 -0,026 -0,019 -0,046 -0,007 -0,007 
-3 -0,008 -0,034 -0,008 -0,054 -0,008 -0,008 
-2 -0,012 -0,046 -0,014 -0,068 -0,011 -0,011 
-1 -0,014 -0,061 -0,018 -0,086 -0,011 -0,011 
0 -0,015 -0,075 -0,014 -0,100 -0,016 -0,016 
1 -0,019 -0,095 -0,020 -0,120 -0,019 -0,019 
2 -0,021 -0,115 -0,014 -0,133 -0,026 -0,026 
3 -0,020 -0,135 -0,009 -0,142 -0,028 -0,028 
4 -0,012 -0,148 0,008 -0,134 -0,028 -0,028 
 
  
18 
 
Table A4: Values for θ1 and θ2 and significance levels 
Days 
Total Banks Ex-Banks 
θ1 θ2 θ1 θ2 θ1 θ2 
-6 -0,721 -0,077 -1,011 -0,345 0,186 0,034 
-5 -2,449 -0,338 -1,525 -0,865 -0,784 -0,109 
-4 -2,784** -0,634 -2,044 -1,563 -0,661 -0,230 
-3 -2,036 -0,851 -1,100 -1,938 -0,776 -0,372 
-2 -3,079** -1,179 -1,453 -2,434* -1,330 -0,615 
-1 -2,311* -1,426 -0,661 -2,659* -1,317 -0,856 
0 -2,406* -1,682 -0,294 -2,759*  -1,663 -1,159 
1 -3,614*** -2,067 -1,273 -3,194*** -1,882 -1,503 
2 -4,203*** -2,515*  -0,761 -3,454*** -2,722* -2,001 
3 -4,284*** -2,971** -0,340 -3,570*** -3,098** -2,566* 
4 -1,932 -3,177*** 1,968 -2,898** -2,970** -3,109** 
  
Table A5: Values for θ1 and θ2 and significance levels (after January 2010) 
Days 
Total Banks Ex-Banks 
θ1 θ2 θ1 θ2 θ1 θ2 
-6 -0,440 -0,048 -1,201 -0,205 0,298 0,055 
-5 -2,283* -0,297 -2,298* -0,596 -0,801 -0,093 
-4 -2,388* -0,557 -2,567* -1,033 -0,741 -0,231 
-3 -1,527 -0,724 -1,060 -1,214 -0,821 -0,384 
-2 -2,401* -0,986 -1,882 -1,534 -1,163 -0,600 
-1 -2,745* -1,285 -2,445* -1,951 -1,154 -0,814 
0 -2,884** -1,599 -1,809 -2,259* -1,667 -1,123 
1 -3,711*** -2,004 -2,616* -2,705** -1,972 -1,490 
2 -4,057*** -2,446* -1,846 -3,019** -2,761* -2,003 
3 -3,830*** -2,864** -1,174 -3,219*** -2,946** -2,550** 
4 -2,429* -3,129** 1,049 -3,040** -2,941** -3,096** 
Where *, ** and *** denotes, respectively, 2,5%, 1% and 0,5% significance levels. 
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Table A3: Moody’s rating system 
Characterization of debt and issuer  Rating Linear transformation 
Highest quality 
In
v
es
tm
en
t 
g
ra
d
e 
Aaa 17 
High quality 
Aa1 16 
Aa2 15 
Aa3 14 
Strong payment capacity 
A1 13 
A2 12 
A3 11 
Adequate payment capacity 
Baa1 10 
Baa2 9 
Baa3 8 
Likely to fulfill obligations, ongoing 
uncertainty 
S
p
ec
u
la
ti
v
e 
g
ra
d
e 
Ba1 7 
Ba2 6 
Ba3 5 
High credit risk 
B1 4 
B2 3 
B3 2 
Very high credit risk 
Caa1 
1 
Caa2 
Caa3 
Near default with possibility of recovery Ca 
Default D 
 
Table A4: Causality test 
 F stastistic Prob. 
RBES do not cause RATBES 0,51011 0,76879 
RATBES do not cause RBES 1,23358 0,29106 
RBPI do not cause RATBPI 0,86470 0,50420 
RATBPI do not cause RBPI 1,15335 0,33033 
RBCP do not cause RATBCP 0,29688 0,91474 
RATBCP do not cause RBCP 0,45017 0,81334 
RPT do not cause RATPT 8,38842 0,00000 
RATPT do not cause RPT 0,86252 0,50569 
RBRISA do not cause RATBRISA 1,77413 0,11525 
RATBRISA do not cause RBRISA 1,03545 0,39519 
REDP do not cause RATEDP 1,22728 0,29399 
RATEDP do not cause REDP 1,91286 0,08950 
RREN do not cause RATREN 0,62824 0,67827 
RATREN do not cause RREN 0,27058 0,92925 
Note: results obtained using 5 lags 
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